Friend
Hey Jake,
If Adam was in a state of freewill, prior to the fall, due to having moral equipoise, as Pink puts it, to either choose good or evil, without bias, at what point do you think God's sovereignty affects Adam's will to choose evil? If Adam's will is truly free, it would seem that the same paradox is involved between Adam and God, as the one that exists now, between all humanity and God, pertaining to sovereignty and freewill.
I'm wondering if the catalyst was the temptation by an external source, which was the serpent. Without the devil's influence, Adam's free will may have never been tested and found lacking. Wouldn't you think? And God, knowing this, used the serpent as part of His sovereign, eternal purpose. Thus, God, through the temptation, which was executed and succumbed to freely, carried out His purpose, sovereignly.
At some point, I'm trying to arrive at the final source. God's sovereignty is eternal; yet, at some point, in the name of justice, man's ultimate culpability must rest on his own choice (i.e., Adam's). Adam's descendants--I totally get it--have not had freewill, but their will is driven by the evil in their heart, thus enslaved to it. But Adam did. But, he was perfect, not holy; so not impervious to sin. He could have chosen righteousness, but didn't. I don't believe that was a random choice, that could have gone either way, if I believe in the sovereignty of God, but it was free. Was the temptation irresistible, much in the way grace is?
Jake
Hey my friend
I think that with Adam (pre-fall), God's sovereignty was expressed via foreknowledge rather than active foreordination. I'm not sure if that leads to the paradox you're referring to. If so, how so?
I think I agree with your second paragraph, with one amendment: the first test of Adam's faithfulness was occasioned by a tree, the fruit of which he was forbidden to eat (the first 'thou shalt not'), regardless of the serpent. The serpent's temptation was move A & E to draw false inferences from God's prohibition (to make the commandments seem contrary to their happiness, as an expression of undue glory on God's part, etc...). Notice, there is one tree and two declarations about this tree: (1) "its unlawful" - God (2) "its lawful" - Satan. A & E's decision would boil down to who's word they trusted.
I think there's a difference between certainty and necessity. By "necessity" we mean that it could not have been otherwise. By "certainty" I mean that it will be one way rather than another, but not because an alternative was impossible (and also without specifying the grounds for its inevitability - prescience or active foreordination). Everything that is necessary is certain, but not everything that is certain is necessary. Adam's fall was "certain," but not "necessary." There are few things that are "necessary," all of which are rooted in God's nature, as in "God is necessarily good" (it's impossible for God not to be good). Now, whatever has happened and will happen is "certain" due to God's sovereignty - 'he predestines everything that comes to pass' (WCF) Given that God's sovereignty may be expressed in two ways: through prescience or active foreordination, therefore a thing may be "certain" for one of these two reasons.
Thoughts?
Friend
First, on your comment: God's sovereignty was expressed via foreknowledge rather than active foreordination. I'm not sure if that leads to the paradox you're referring to. If so, how so?
Isn't, according to Calvinism, foreknowledge and foreordination the same thing? (cf. Rom 8:29; 1 Pet. 1:20)
Isn't foreknowledge, in the prescience sense, the same way an Arminian understands it, that God merely knows what will take place and predestine it, based on that foreknowledge? If that's the case, then, to me, the paradox is the same for Adam, as it is for post-Adamic humanity, when trying to reconcile God's sovereignty and man's (supposed) free choice; God merely knew what was going to take place with Adam's temptation and fall, but didn't necessarily bring it about.
Now, I understand your 'necessity vs. certainty' analogy; you're saying Adam's predestination was certain, rather than necessary. So, given that all the proper ingredients, or variables, were put in place, the desired (will of God) outcome will be achieved with certainty? And is this what you are also saying about our own predestination? Is it, for us, as well, a matter of certainty and not necessity? So, when God chooses us in Him before the foundations of the world, He, of certainty, or of necessity, ordains us?
But, getting back to Adam, so what you're saying is that God, with certainty, not necessity, sovereignly brought about His plan, that Adam would fall by his temptation, by working the combination of circumstances that would guarantee that end result, according to prescience, or God's knowledge ahead of time, that it would so occur?
Jake
Calvinism and Arminianism both teach that (1) God predestines all things that happen, (2) God predestines all things in two different ways:
(a) actively (e.g. creation) and
(b) passively (i.e. prescience).
What they disagree on is what "things" are included in (a) and (b). Arminians will put more far more things in (b) than Calvinists. And the Calvinists will put more things in (a) than the Arminians.
But here's the kicker, both agree that the fall of man belongs in (b).
Do you think that (b) creates a paradox? What precisely are the truths that seem to cancel each other out?
Friend
It's interesting to me that a prescience view of the Fall is held by both sides. Correct me if I'm wrong, but here, God employs a seemingly different kind of sovereignty than He does for election. God chose us in Him before the foundations of the world, according to Paul, which precedes the Fall. But, after His election of us, which you're saying is active (based on the fact that humanity would not have freewill), God acts toward Adam in a passive sovereignty.
We were chosen before the foundations of the world, from all eternity past, to be found in Christ, according to the sovereignty of God and His unconditional election. Yet, with Adam, who was given freewill, with equipoise, to freely choose without bias, God takes a passive sovereignty, to work circumstances out, according to prescience. Wouldn't an immutable God continue to do the same for post-Adamic humanity?
The paradox, to me, is a Calvinistic sovereignty and an Arminian sovereignty coexisting. It makes sense that we, who have no freewill, are foreknown, elected, predestined and irresistibly drawn by God's grace; it wouldn't make sense, that God would be able to do all those things, if we had freewill. With Adam's freewill, these things seem more susceptible to randomness of Adam's actions, unless God is completely "active" in the Fall.
Jake
It's interesting to me that a prescience view of the Fall is held by both sides. Correct me if I'm wrong, but here, God employs a seemingly different kind of sovereignty than He does for election. God chose us in Him before the foundations of the world, according to Paul, which precedes the Fall. But, after His election of us, which you're saying is active (based on the fact that humanity would not have freewill), God acts toward Adam in a passive sovereignty.
I think that's a good summary of the Reformed position.
We were chosen before the foundations of the world, from all eternity past, to be found in Christ, according to the sovereignty of God and His unconditional election. Yet, with Adam, who was given freewill, with equipoise, to freely choose without bias, God takes a passive sovereignty, to work circumstances out, according to prescience. Wouldn't an immutable God continue to do the same for post-Adamic humanity?
I don't see a link between God's immutability and His being incapable of toggling back and forth between active and passive predestination. Perhaps you can develop that for me a bit.
If God continued to order the events of humanity post-fall according to his passive sovereignty, then unfortunately none would come to possess eternal life, given that the fall ruined the particular form of freedom that A & E possess. Now being inclined only towards unrighteousness, God would merely foresee their damnation. The rescue of the elect would take an active decree of God.
The paradox, to me, is a Calvinistic sovereignty and an Arminian sovereignty coexisting. It makes sense that we, who have no freewill, are foreknown, elected, predestined and irresistibly drawn by God's grace; it wouldn't make sense, that God would be able to do all those things, if we had freewill. With Adam's freewill, these things seem more susceptible to randomness of Adam's actions, unless God is completely "active" in the Fall.
If I'm reading you correctly, your assumption is that Edenic freedom would make election of anything unstable, for humans could always do otherwise. In this, I think you are accenting a common issue related to sovereignty and freedom.
The problem, as I see it, is that as the alternative, one then must hold to a hard determinism/fatalism of all things if God is said to have control of all things. I think that goes beyond the bounds of Scripture.
